Thursday, March 30, 2006

All the DOCEX news that's fit to print

That old New York Times moniker was recently strained to include the DOCEX Iraqi document release, even though the information had been in the public domain for two weeks and had been the topic of bloggers and other media outlets for half a year. Reporter Scott Shane was picked to introduce the story, which he seemed to suggest was perhaps just that-- a story.

Shane sprinkled his report with the usual cadre of 'anonymous intelligence sources' to help poo-poo the significance of the project, as if they themselves had personally read each document. Stephen Hayes fired back:
Lost on Shane, it seems, is that these documents were released in large part so that we would no longer have to rely on the opinions of anonymous intelligence officials who, according to the Senate Intelligence Committee's bipartisan report, knew very little about Iraq before the war.
The Times had little choice but to eventually weigh in, since before the war they were in the position the Weekly Standard is now--the champion source of all that's bad about Saddam. Judy Miller was their go-to glamour girl regards Saddam and his weaponry, but the Times probably felt their rather public flogging and dismissal of Miller was the last word on the subject. After all, everyone knows Chalabi was a fraud, right? And Miller used Chalabi as a source.

The Times tried to recoup their rep by printing the NSA leak story over the protestations of Bush, which got them back in the cozy with their base. It's quite understandable they wouldn't want to risk losing those good vibes by having to reverse themselves yet again on Iraq. After all, Miller has presumably disappeared into the Aspen groves.

Scott Shane reported on a sensitive story that Judy Miller also reported on, but his line of thought trended away from a state-sponsored theory, while Miller left the Iraq option open. Shane was writing for the Baltimore Sun at the time, but as Hayes mentions, you'd think he'd be interested in getting to the bottom of the story once and for all, which the documents or tapes might provide.

But we all know there's only one bottom to any story, and most reporters believe that was reached awhile ago regards Iraq. Those folks would seem to have little choice but to portray the DOCEX thing as a sandbox for nutjobs. And, should anything interesting actually turn up, those ubiqitous anonymous intelligence sources are always standing at the ready.

THE KSM LETTERS 3/30/06

Talk Left is talking about the Moussaoui trial and has provided a link to a WaPo post that directs to a site containing evidentiary documents from the mastermind of 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. His statement details the 9/11 plot from beginning to end, wherein he indicates his suspicion of Zacarious. For this reason KSM had relegated him to a second wave attack against the west coast following 9/11, which was to use non-middle easterners. This was the Los Angeles attack Bush mentioned a few months ago.

Not sure if KSM is truthful, but I found a few of his statements curious nevertheless. One was that he didn't join al Qaeda until 1998, another that he refused to recite their loyalty oath until after 9/11. He was in many ways a lone wolf. Funny, he made mention of Moussaoui being stubborn and confident, which he blamed on being raised in the west, however he doesn't seem to recognize that same trait within himself.

There was frequent mention of a money-man in the UAE, but no mention of where the money came from. The 9/11 Commission told us we shouldn't worry about it, since it was a relatively small sum. Wonder who provided it?

SCOTT SHANE WEIGHS IN AGAIN 3/31/06

The Times has a piece this morning about the above-mentioned KSM documents used in the Moussaoui trial. Scott Shane was involved in this story, too, and he makes a good point by contrasting the nimble nature of AQ compared to the lumbering bureaucracy of the American Intelligence apparatus that contributed to 9/11.

However, Mr Shane and his co-writer seem more focused on the FBI's incompetence in this case than anything the enemy said. Not surprising, since that storyline leads toward a finger pointing at Bush. Based on the email traffic and testimony from some of the career agents, such 20/20 hindsight might persuade a Bush-hater there was a conspiracy afoot.

In my view it's simply more proof of bureaucratic incompetence, stove piping, and career protecting. President Bush is certainly not immune from being unaware of certain realities. For example, he appointed the controversial Barbara Bodine to an Iraq position after the war (check out "The Man who Warned America", the story about FBI counter terror agent John O'Neill for details), which suggests his staff might have been ignorant of what occurred in Yemen. She was removed from the position after only one month.

But the point here is not to dwell on past mistakes, it's to learn from them. KSM's cocky attitude regards his ability to hit America should've sent a strong wakeup call to the intel bureacracy. Bush reacted by shuffling the deck, but agents in the field are the ones who git er done. So far they seem to be succeeding, as we've had zero follow-on attacks. By the way, our post 9/11 security impressed KSM, which he alluded to in the statements. Guess the Times didn't think that was fit to print.

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