The Sabri files

The NBC WMD scoop story has apparently blown over like a popcorn summer thunderstorm. Perhaps people are getting overloaded with this stuff, but nevertheless Powerline has a good synopsis of the shenanigans with NBC, warning us to read beyond the headlines. That’s good advice for every MSM story, especially for this one, since the headline could have easily read,

”Top aide to Saddam AGREED WITH CIA that Iraq had WMDs and wanted more”

Instead NBC chose to make the CIA appear derelict for disbelieving what amounted to a disagreement about the bio-weapons program. Sabri agreed that Saddam badly wanted a nuke, but diverged on the run-up time. Perhaps the CIA was remembering the Who song, "Won't Be Fooled Again" in reference to the last time they cockily advised that Saddam wasn't very close to getting a nuke.

The Foreign Minister was by all public accounts a loyal regime member, as much as Tariq Aziz. Yet he wasn’t included in the deck of 55 most-wanted cards, and he survives in the open today. The NBC story talks of a falling out when he failed to defect, but it sounds like in reality he was in good enough stead to get a get out of jail free card.

So it appears the NBC reporters missed the real story. Here we have an inner circle member of Saddam’s team telling the world stuff like this:

Iraqi foreign minister Naji Sabri tells the UN: “I hereby declare before you that Iraq is totally clear of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Our country is ready to receive any scientific experts, accompanied by politicians you choose to represent any one of your countries, to tell us which places and scientific and industrial installations they would wish to see.”

Then telling the CIA another story. Speaking of stories, keep in mind he blabbed to the CIA during a pre-war visit to New York, so one wonders what he might have told Khatami.

But the intrigue is far from over. Just last month Stephen Hayes mentioned Sabri in a story about the fall of the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

One day after the floppy disks from Naji Sabri's office manager were passed to a representative of "another U.S. government agency"--presumably the CIA--the recipient reported back that the find was "a treasure trove." That was the last that any of these officials have heard about the recovered documents.

It sounds as if this treasure trove is not part of the DOCEX release. Can we assume there’s any correlation between the timing of Hayes’ story, the NBC leak, and the document release?

CLOSE, MR. HAYES 3/25/06

Although Hayes might disagree, his latest article purporting to show a link between Saddam and Bin Laden via the Fedayeen doesn't quite connect enough dots:

Beginning in 1994, the Fedayeen Saddam opened its own paramilitary training camps for volunteers, graduating more than 7,200 "good men racing full with courage and enthusiasm" in the first year. Beginning in 1998, these camps began hosting "Arab volunteers from Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, 'the Gulf,' and Syria." It is not clear from available evidence where all of these non-Iraqi volunteers who were "sacrificing for the cause" went to ply their newfound skills.

What I'm getting is that Saddam recruited Arab fools to sacrifice themselves for his the sake of his regime. The 'Heroes Attack' waged later by the Fedayeen could be seen as nothing more than a paramilitary defense of the nation.

But when you tie this with Hayes' previous stories about Saddam's connections to UBL regards a relationship to foment terrorism in the Saudi Kingdom, and the Fedayeen's reported involvement with Malaysian terrorist groups the picture gets a little clearer. After all, the intended goals of both operations could only be outwardly seen as helping Bin Laden's cause.

What would be ultimately persuasive would be to find a link to either Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and/or Ramzi Yousef, which would amount to a smoking howitzer. But short of such a bombshell these documents clearly indicate Saddam was involved in training a paramilitary force to not only protect his regime but to promote regional destablization through his pan-Arabic vision. By itself not grounds for an immediate invasion, but there are too many puzzle pieces still lying on the table to make the final call.