Phase II and more of the same

Amidst the fireworks about ABC's 9/11 docu-drama the world was tossed another hot potato Friday--the Senate's long-awaited Phase II Intelligence report on Iraq, which suggests the pre-war intelligence was total garbage.

While the democrats pop champagne corks and draft impeachment speeches the MSM is doing their level best to help by cherry-picking the worst items for Bush and headlining the heck out of 'em. They know most people won't read the report.

If you do you'll find some curiosities, but let's start with their caveat:

"As noted in the report, intelligence is not a perfect science and we should not expect perfection from Intelligence Community analysts"

Words to the wise. Now let's look at some points of interest. Since the Plame affair is still in the news it's prudent to look at the report's conclusions regards two Iraqi delegations to Niger and the yellowcake road:

"The purpose of a visit to Niger by the Iraqi Ambassador to the Vatican, Wissam al-Zahawie, was to invite the president of Niger to visit Iraq. The other visit involved discussions of a Nigerian oil purchase from Iraq"

Ha. As Christopher Hitchens has pointed out, Zahawie was involved in Iraq's nuclear program. Why would he travel to Niger just to invite the president to Iraq? Is that SOP? And if true, why would Saddam want to see him? The report doesn't speculate, prefering to take Zahawie's word. That won't be the last time the report fails to challenge the veracity of ex-regime officials.

As to Farouk Hijazi's infamous trip to Sudan to meet bin Laden:

"During the meeting in Khartoum, bin Ladin reportedly asked that Iraq allow him to open an office in the country, provide him with Chinese sea mines, provide military training and broadcast speeches of a radical anti-Saudi cleric Shaykh Salman al-Awdah."

The report indicates that Saddam rejected those 'demands' (one of the MSM bullet point headlines) without speculating as to why bin Laden was in position to make any demands to begin with. Was Saddam being blackmailed, and if so, why? Was it a quid pro quo, and if so, what did Saddam want in return?

If anything the screaming headline from this report should be the inaccuracy of the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, partly used to justify the invasion. It might explain the overall mood at the CIA, or shall we say CYA.

Something else to keep in mind. The Intel Committeee is bi-partisan in makeup but is populated by two republicans who've lately been very critical of Bush, Chuck Hagel and Olympia Snowe. This doesn't mean they slanted the report.

But the hypocrisy of Rockefeller and Levin is stunning. Rockefeller supported the war and called Saddam an imminent threat but is now accusing Bush of twisting things. It's akin to the airbrushing campaign currently being attempted by the Clintonites against ABC 9/11 show, which is a slick attempt to con the public into believing that threats only materialized after Bush took office.

Well, 9/11 had a way of opening everyone's eyes (mine included) even though warnings like this had been issued by ABC's Sheila MacVicar in 1999. But despite the internet historical record many continue to insist Bush made up the connections--and they do it with a straight face. Amazing talent.

HT Say Anything



MORE 9/9/06

If you'd like a searchable version of the PDF document, just see the Cap'n. It's a better way to peruse the report, of which I've wasted way too much time on today at the expense of cutting the grass. Oh well, there's always tomorrow.

For all intents and porpoises part one is an assessment of how the Iraq Survey Group final report pertained to the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) used in part by Bush to justify his war decision.

Their conclusion was as follows. Saddam entered into a post-Gulf War gambit of pretending to possess stockpiles of WMD to fool his neighbors while pretending otherwise in the face of UNSCOM. He played the game a little too well and had almost the entire intelligence universe snookered, which made it impossible for anyone to believe he'd voluntarily disarmed as claimed.

Similar to the final ISG conclusions the Senate agreed his overarching goal was to end the sanctions and towards that end had purged most of his stockpiles by the mid 1990s. They all claim he was waiting to restart them as soon as the dropped sanctions unclogged the flow of oil money.

Here's a question. If the sanctions game ended in 1998 with the tossing of UNSCOM and Desert Fox why wouldn't that actually increase the likelihood of a relationship with bin Laden? The chance of losing the sanctions was over--he'd thrown out the UN--but he did have a pot of skimmed Oil-for-Food proceeds to throw around. He was basically shafted at every turn, a situation people have warned us about regards the Butcher.

Finally, there's a very interesting end note on pages 142-144 about an Iraqi who came to the attention of CIA before the invasion with direct access to Saddam. The Senators discussed whether to include this intelligence or not, but felt compelled to after a 60 Minutes interview of his CIA handler, who claimed the source told them Iraq had no WMDs.

The Senators were shocked, because they claim he told the CIA Saddam wanted a nuke and could make one within two years, had an active Chem program and also possessed a rudimentary bio program. After the media blitz they went back and checked their notes and confirmed the above.

The report was vague about the fate of that leaking CIA chief. By the way, the source's name was Naji Sabri, and despite being a high-level regime member he was not included in the deck of cards and remains free to this day while his former boss sits in jail.

From my armchair perch it seems the CIA and others were far too willing to buy some of the garbage these sources were selling, who were probably spreading disinformation on behalf of Saddam or to feather their own post-war nests.