Tuesday, September 12, 2006

When is a document a link?

Some are having fun with this document released lately from DOCEX that includes charming pictures of al-Zarqawi. Is it a smoking gun?

At the same time Pajamas Media, Gateway Pundit and other sites also pointed to this document, CMPC-2003-001488, as compelling evidence Saddam was in bed with the Taliban/AQ. But let's not get too far ahead here. The fact they had a dossier on Zarqawi only means they knew he was there (something the liberals will occasionally dispute). That doesn't mean he was invited to the country.

The Senate Intelligence Committee recently commented on the matter, saying that Saddam knew Z-man was in-country but tried to have him deported. Gee, wonder if that was around the same time Jordan implicated him in the murder of American envoy Laurence Foley? Around the other same time Abu Nidal was meeting his maker in the presence of Mukhabarat agents, feeling so depressed he killed himself with three shots to the head. It's amazing what some will believe.

The Senate report also said Saddam was wary of AQ because he thought bin Laden wanted to destablize Iraq, a nugget the democrats have been repeating since 2003, yet the two parties kept meeting through the late 90s. It's amazing what some will believe.

When Farouq Hijazi met UBL in Khartoum the bearded one asked for an office in Baghdad and some assorted weaponry. Why did he expect anything? The only sensible answer is because he was either offering the Butcher freelance services or was setting up an extortion racket. But we know they shared interests...both liked the thoughts of dead Shias, dead Israelis, dead Saudi Royals, dead Americans, and dead Sunnis who refused to obey orders. Short of religion they almost qualify as soul-mates.

Yet the murk never recedes quite far enough. The closest thing to a smoking gun seems to be the possibility that Iraq agents were embedded in Kandahar prior to 9/11. The documents don't prove whether they were cooperating or eavesdropping, or both, or even there.

Take the Afghani consular document:
Our Afghani source #002 (info on him in paper slip ‘1’) has informed us that Afghani consular Ahmed Dahistani (info on him in paper slip ‘2’) had spoken before him of the following:

1- That Usama Bin Ladin and the Taliban group in Afghanistan are in contact with Iraq and that a group from the Taliban and Usama Bin Ladin’s group had conducted a visit to Iraq.
The last reported trip to Baghdad was in 1998, the same year Farouq Hijazi visited Kandahar. Hard to say which one this might be, or maybe a new one.
2- That America possesses evidence that Iraq and Usama Bin Ladin’s group had cooperated to strike targets inside America.
Since this was dated 9/15/01, and since the Atta in Prague story didn't hit the wires until 9/18/01, if indeed that was the link it didn't come from open sources, it came from the inside.
3- In case Taliban and Usama’s group are proven involved in those sabotage operations, it will be possible that America directs strikes at Iraq and Afghanistan.
That could be anything from a "we're so busted" message to a "we've been had" message.
4- That the Afghani consular had heard about the Iraq connections with Usama Bin Ladin’s group during his presence in Iran.
Presuming the intel discussed was Atta in Prague, that was known to the CIA a day or so after 9/11. How would Iran have known?
5- In the light of what preceded we suggest writing to the Intentions Committee about the above information.
Perhaps Saddam's response was something like this--"we will crush their heads".

At any rate, the first anthrax letters were mailed on September 18th, three days after this document and the same day the AP printed a leaked story about Atta in Prague. AP, AP, weren't they recently in the news? We also got this story on September 18, which suggests that Pakistan might have tipped bin Laden about our impending attack, and that both Pakistan and Iraq knew we would be attacked on September 11th. Or something.

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